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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE AMERICAN OIL COMPANY, 
a Maryland Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
GENERAL CONTRACTING CORP., 
a Utah corporation; FEDERAL INSUR-
ANCE CO., a corporation; and UNITED 
STATES STEEL CORPORATION, a New 
Jersey corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
No. 10326 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by a supplier of materials which were 
ordered by and delivered to a subcontractor of the general 
contractor of a State Road Commission contract. Said sup-
plier seeks to recover from the general contractor and its 
surety. 
2 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After default judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff 
against the insolvent subcontractor, the case was heard by 
the trial court on cross motions for summary judgment. The 
court granted the motion of the general contractor and its 
surety, and plaintiff appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 4, 1961, the State Road Commission of 
Utah entered into a construction contract with the defend-
ant-respondent, United States Steel Corporation, the general 
contractor, hereinafter referred to as, "U. S. Steel," for the 
construction of a bridge in Daggett County, Utah. U. S. 
Steel furnished the contract bond required by and provided 
in the usual form by the State Road Commission, which 
bond was issued by defendant-respondent, Federal Insurance 
Co., hereinafter referred to as the "Surety." Between De-
cember 11, 1961, and December 10, 1962 ( R-33,34 ), plaintiff-
appellant, The American Oil Company, hereinafter called 
"Plaintiff," supplied materials used on the project to the 
defendant General Contracting Corp., a subcontractor of 
U. S. Steel, hereinafter called the "Subcontractor." 
The Subcontractor did not contest that it owed Plaintiff 
$3,773.00 and allowed default judgment to be entered 
against it for this amount (R-16). Effective as of May 14, 
1963, the Utah Legislature amended Chapter 1 of Title 14, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, by repealing sections 14-1-1 
through 14-1-4 (hereinafter called the "old statute"), and 
added 14-1-5 through 14-1-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
hereinafter called the "new statute." Both the old and the 
new statute deal with public contractors' bonds. 
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The contract and bond executed by U. S. Steel and its 
Surety were executed on October 4, 1961 before repeal of 
the old statute and enactment of the new. 
Under the old statute no notice of any kind was required 
to be given to a general contractor by a materialman of a 
subcontractor (such as plaintiff) prior to filing suit, and the 
event controlling when suit upon the bond could be timely 
filed was "the completion and final settlement of the con-
tract." The old statute contains a special statute of limita-
tions requiring that suit on the bond "must be commenced 
within one year thereafter," (In other words, one year after 
"the completion and final settlement") Section 14-1-2, UCA 
1953. 
The only disputed fact in this case concerns when "the 
completion and final settlement" of the contract occurred. 
The Road Commission's agent advised Plaintiff by affidavit 
that this was May 21, 1963 ( R-35, R-46). However, this is 
denied by U.S. Steel (Parag~tph 5, R-26), which relies on a 
supplemental affidavit ( R-S}sfgned by the same person em-
ployed by the Road Commission. A subsequent third affi-
davit ( R-46) was filed by this same employee to further 
clarify the validity of the May 21, 1963 date. This dispute 
is immaterial under Plaintiff's contention that it is a third 
party beneficiary of the general contract. 
Under the new statute, "Every suit instituted on the 
aforesaid payment bond" is subject to a special statute of 
limitations which specifies 
that no such suit shall be commenced after the expira-
tion of one year from the date on which the claimant 
. . . furnished or supplied the last of the materials. 
( 14-1-6, emphasis added.) 
The next clause also provides that any claimant, such as 
plaintiff, that did not have a contractual relationship with 
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the general contractor 
shall not have a right of action upon such payment 
bond unless he has given written notice to such con-
tractor within ninety days from the date on which 
such claimant . . . furnished or supplied the last of 
the material ( 14-1-6, emphasis added ) . 
In other words, the new statute would have required 
Plaintiff to give U. S. Steel notice on or before March 9, 
1963, ( 90 days after December 10, 1962), although the new 
statute did not become law until May 14, 1963; also, Plain-
tiff's suit would have to be filed more than five months sooner 
than under the old statute, or by December 9, 1963, instead 
of May 20, 1964. If U.S. Steel is correct that "the completion 
and final settlement" of the contract occurred prior to May 
16, 1963, Plaintiff's statutory rights (as distinguished from 
contractual rights) under the old statute against the surety 
would be barred because Plaintiff commenced the instant 
proceedings by filing its complaint on May 15, 1964 ( R-8-A, 
reverse). No prior written notice was ever given to U. S. 
Steel by plaintiff of its claim. Plaintiff's Complaint makes no 
reference to the new statute, but paragraph 9 of the Com-
plaint ( R-2) alleges that U. S. Steel and its Surety owe 
Plaintiff $3,773.00 pursuant to the contract and bond exe-
cuted by U.S. Steel and its Surety with the State Road Com-
mission. The bond, incorporated and made a part of the 
contract by reference, provides that U. S. Steel 
shall also pay or cause to be paid all claims of .. · 
any other person or persons who supply . . . any of 
the subcontractors of the principal ( R-4, 5). 
The trial court prepared and filed the following mem-
orandum decision: 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for 
hearing on the 20th day of January, 1965, at the hour 
of 9:00 o'clock, A.M. on plaintiff's motion for sum-
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mary judgment and on defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment. 
The matter was argued and submitted and the 
Court being fully advised in the premises finds that 
defendants' motion for summary judgment should be 
granted for the following reasons: 
1. That the plaintiff is not a proper party plain-
tiff; 
2. That said action should have been filed in 
Daggett County; and 
3. That said action was not filed within the 
time required by the statute. 
Dated: January 23, 1965. ( R-48) 
POINT I 
THE CONTRACTORS' BOND STATUTE IS 
NOT THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY OF PLAIN-
TIFF. 
Neither the old statute nor the new statute constitute 
the exclusive remedy of an unpaid materialman in an action 
against a general contractor. 
In paragraph 9 of the Complaint ( R-2) as one of the 
grounds of its action against U. S. Steel, Plaintiff seeks to 
recover as a third party beneficiary under the construction 
contract between U. S. Steel and the State Road Commis-
sion. By the terms of the contract (R-4, R-5) U. S. Steel 
agreed to pay materialmen of subcontractors who had sup-
plied materials to the project. Plaintiff was such a material-
man, and it has a nonstatutory right based on contract to sue 
U. S. Steel for payment under the construction contract. 
r• 
~· 
I 
I 
I. 
1 
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Plaintiff's contract action against U. S. Steel is separate and 
apart from any rights which plaintiff may have under the 
statute against the Surety. 
Both the old and the new statutes provided remedies 
and rights for claimants upon the bond and against the 
surety only. These statutes require that a bond be furnished. 
Neither requires a contract. Both describe generally the 
type of bond and then go on to set forth the rights and 
remedies of laborers and materialmen in actions upon the 
bonds. 
It is submitted that the Legislature was speaking of 
suits on bonds only; there is no provision respecting suits 
on construction contracts. An indication of the purpose and 
intent of the statutes is found in the Title to the new statute, 
Chapter 15, Laws of Utah, 1963, which also repealed the old: 
An Act to provide for the Bonding of Contractors for 
Public Buildings . . . and to Repeal Sections . . . 
Relating to Bonding Requirements on Public Con-
tracts ... 
Pertinent language from the two statutes are quoted: 
In the old statute, Section 14-1-2, supra, the following 
phrases are used: "action .. on the bond," "only one action 
shall be brought upon said bond" and "forever barred from 
recovery upon such bond." In the new statute, Section 
14-1-6, supra, the following appear: "shall have the right 
to sue on such payment bond," and "Every suit instituted on 
the aforesaid payment bond." 
These statutes relate only to the requirement of furnish-
ing bonds and rights and actions thereupon. They do not 
require construction contracts; and they provide no remedies 
or actions upon such contracts. They were enacted for the 
protection and benefit of obligees, creditors, and sureties and 
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not for the protection of contractors, as stated in State v. 
Campbell Building Co. ( 1938 Utah) 77 P. 2d 341, where 
the Court discussed the application of the old statute: 
It may aid in understanding to bear in mind that 
this statute deals only with actions against the surety. 
Claims of creditors against the contractor are not 
affected by the statute. 'Ve opine such claims may be 
asserted at any time tvithin the general statute of lim- . 
itations. It is only when it is sought to hold the surety 
- only when recovery is to be made under the bond -
that the provisions of the statute come into play. The 
restrictions are two-fold: To give the obligee a prior-
ity to determine and protect any claim it may have, 
and to fix a one year limitation on the surety's liability 
to other creditors ... The statute is not for the benefit 
of the contractor but for the benefit of the obligee, 
creditors, and surety. (Emphasis added) 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF, AS A THIRD PARTY BENEFI-
CIARY UNDER THE CONSTRUCTION CON-
TRACT, IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT 
AGAINST U. S. STEEL. 
By the terms of the construction contract between the 
State Road Commission and U. S. Steel, the latter agreed 
to pay materialmen of subcontractors who had supplied 
materials on the project. The contract provides: 
WITNESSETH, That for and in consideration of pay-
ments, hereinafter mentioned, to be made by the 
Commission, the Contractor agrees to furnish all labor 
and equipment; to furnish and deliver all materials 
... in the construction of ( 1) Steel Arch Bridge. 
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The contract further provided: 
The said plans and specifications and the notice to 
contractors, instruction to bidders, the proposal, spec-
ial provisions, and contract bond, are hereby made a 
part of this agreement as fully and to the same effect 
as if the same had been set forth at length herein. 
(Emphasis added, R-4). 
t 
U. S. Steel did provide a bond, R-5, which ls executed as 
principal and this bond became a part of the contract by 
reference and its terms became the terms of the contract. It 
provided in part as follows: 
NOW THEREFORE, if the above bonded principal 
as contractor ... shall also pay or cause to be paid 
all claims of subcontractors, laborers, mechanics, ma-
terialmen, ranchmen, farmers, merchants, and any 
other person or persons who supply the principal or 
any of the subcontractors of the principal with labor, 
work, material, ranch, or farm products. provisions. 
goods and supplies of any kind including tools, ma-
chinery, and equipment to the extent of their use 
and depreciation on this contract; and shall pay all 
just debts incurred therefor, in carrying on such work 
... then this obligation shall be null and void, other-
wise it shall remain in full force and effect. ( Empha-
sis added, R-5). 
Construing the contract as a whole, U. S. Steel had 
specifically agreed to pay the claims of materialmen, includ-
ing materialmen of subcontractors. Plaintiff was such a 
materialman, having supplied materials to Subcontractor. 
Aside from any rights which Plaintiff might have under the 
Contractor's Bond statutes, U. S. Steel is liable to the Plain-
tiff on the contract on ordinary principles of contract law. 
Under the construction contract, Plaintiff, as a material-
man, was a third party beneficiary (creditor beneficiary). 
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Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 4, Sections 779 - and 787. Utah 
has long recognized the doctrine and right of third party 
beneficiaries and has applied the doctrine in favor of laborers 
and materialmen. The principle was stated in Brown v. 
Markland, 16 Utah 360, 52 P. 597. There the plaintiff, a 
materialman, sued for materials furnished in connection with 
the operation of a mine. One Frailey had entered into a 
contract to sell the mine to defendant and by the terms 
thereof defendant was to assume and pay claims of material-
men. The contract did not state who the materialmen were. 
On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed in favor of the ma-
terialman and quoted from the earlier case of Montgomery 
v. Spencer, 15 Utah 495, 50 P. 623: 
. . . where a promise or contract has been made be-
tween two parties for the benefit of a third, an action 
will lie thereon at the instance and in the name of 
the party to be benefitted. although the promise or 
contract was made without his knowledge, and with-
out any consideration moving from him. 
The doctrine has been approved and reaffirmed in later 
Utah cases. Smith v. Bowman, 32 Utah 33-39, 88 P. 687; 
Blyth-Fargo Co. v. Free ( 1915 Utah) 148 P. 427; M. H. 
Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety Co. ( 1922 Utah) 
211 P. 998; and DeLuxe Glass Co. v. Martin, ( 1949 Utah) 
208 P. 2d 1127. 
See-also Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 4, Sections 775 and 
788. Section 779 J, pp. 60, 61 of the latter work contains a 
discussion of the relationship and rights of laborers and 
materialmen as affected by the federal contractors' bond 
statute, the Miller Act. 40 USCA Section 270. The follow-
ing is quoted from that work: 
Those who supply labor and materials to such a sub-
contractor are creditor beneficiaries of the principal 
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contractor's promise. As such beneficiaries, they are 
in a 'contractual relationship' with him just as clearly 
as if they had sold their labor and materials directly 
to him. 
The bond, in which the surety promises an owner 
that laborers and materialmen shall be paid, creates 
a 'contractual relationship' between them and the 
surety; and if the principal contractor promises either 
the owner or a subcontractor that they shall be paid, 
a similar 'contractual relationship' is created between 
them and the principal contractor. 
The rights of a third party beneficiary under a contract 
are established once it is shown that the contract necessarily 
and directly benefits him. DeLuxe Glass Company v. Martin, 
supra. The intention of the parties to this construction con-
tract were unmistakably clear. The provisions, quoted above, 
contain an express promise by U. S. Steel to the State Road 
Commission to pay materialmen including materialmen of 
subcontractors. 
Plaintiff's action against U. S. Steel on the contract was 
timely filed because this cause was not necessarily based on 
either the old or the new statute. As stated in State v. 
Campbell Building Co., ( 1938 Utah), 77 P. 2d 341, 344: 
The statute is not for the benefit of the contractor but 
for the benefit of the obligee, creditors, and surety. 
Earlier in the same decision the court held (page 344): 
... this statute deals only with actions against the 
surety. Claims of creditors against the contractor are 
not affected by the statute. We opine such claims may 
be asserted at any time within the general statute of 
limitations. 
This suit, founded upon the written conb·act was timely 
filed, and would fall within the general statute of limitations. 
l 
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Section 78-12-23, UCA 1953. The court erred in holding that 
Plaintiff's action was not filed soon enough, 
The only difference to Plaintiff if recovery for Plaintiff 
is awarded under the third party beneficiary contract doc-
trine, rather than under the Contractor's Bonds Statute, is 
that Plaintiff would not be entitled to statutory attorney 
fees under Section 14-1-4. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE ACTION SHOULD HA VE BEEN FILED 
IN DAGGETT COUNTY. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the Trial Court held that 
the action should have been filed in Daggett County (R-48). 
Plaintiff's suit was filed in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County. The old statute, Section 14-1-2, UCA 1953, in effect 
when suit was filed, provided in pertinent part: " ... any 
person who has supplied labor or materials ... may sue ... 
in any court having jurisdiction in the County where the 
contract was to be performed, ... " This is a venue require-
ment; it is not jurisdictional. 17 Am Jur and 295, Contractors' 
Bonds, Section 116. 
The federal contractors' bonds statute, The Miller Act, 
40 USCA Section 270 (b ), contains a similar provision: 
" ... every suit instituted under this section shall be brought 
in ... the United States District Court for any district in 
which the contract was to be performed and executed and 
not elsewhere ... " 
The Federal Courts have construed the above provision 
to be a venue requirement and not one of jurisdiction. See 
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Texas Construction Company vs. United States ( 1956) 236 
F. 2d 138. In that case the appellants, contractors, con-
tended that the district court which tried the case was with-
out jurisdiction because the contract was performed in an-
other district. In its opinion the court said: 
Both parties here concede that, upon proper motion, 
the defendant in a case brought in a district other 
than that in which the contract was to be performed 
could require a dismissal of the action as being in the 
wrong venue. Appellants also concede that if the 
Court holds this to be a venue statute rather than one 
affecting jurisdiction of the Court, then their failure 
to move by timely motion to attack the venue would 
be fatal to their cause here. 
The trial court had overruled all pleas asserting lack of juris-
diction. The Circuit Court affirmed on the ground that the 
statute was a restriction only on venue rather than on the 
power of the court to entertain the suit. It also said: 
On this ground also we feel that the requirement as 
to the district in which suit may be filed, contained 
in the Miller Act, is only one for the benefit of the 
defendants and may thus be waived by them, as may 
any other question of venue. 
To the same effect see U. S. for Use of Mitchell Bros. 
Truck Lines v. Jen-Mar Constr. Co., 223 F. Supp. 646, and 
U. S. to Use of Bailey-Lewis-Williams of Fla. Inc. vs. Peter 
Kiewit Sons of Canada, 195 F. Supp. 752, affirmed, 299 
F 2d 930. 
If defendants had wanted the case tried in Daggett 
County their remedy was to have moved for a change of 
venue by responsive pleading early in the proceeding. Sec-
tion 78-13-8, UCA 1953. Having failed to do so they waived 
all right in this regard. 
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Of course under Plaintiff's third party beneficiary claim, 
Salt Lake County and not Daggett County, is the proper 
venue. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT A PROPER 
PARTY PLAINTIFF. 
The trial court in its Memorandum Decision ( R-48) 
held that the plaintiff was not a proper party plaintiff. 
The old statute, Section 14-1-2, UCA 1953, provided: 
. any person who has supplied labor or materials . . . 
may sue the contractor and his surety, for his own benefit, 
in the name of the obligee, ... " This provision was permis-
sive and not mandatory; was a procedural requirement, and 
was not jurisdictional. Failure to comply with the provision 
constituted no bar to plaintiff's suit. 
A similar problem arose in the Utah case Board of Edu-
cation vs. Southern Surety Co. ( 1930 Utah) 287 P. 332. 
There, a materialman who had supplied materials to a con-
tractor on a public school building, brought suit against the 
contractor and the surety. The statute, a predecessor of the 
present statute, required that in all suits personal notice of 
the pendency of such suits shall be given to all known cred-
itors and that notice by publication in a newspaper should 
be made for three successive weeks. There the defendants 
contended that the publication of the notice did not meet 
the above requirements. The Supreme Court held that the 
requirement was not jurisdictional, saying: 
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Even if it should be conceded that the appellant is 
right in its contention that the notice was not pub-
lished for the full period of time contemplated by the 
statute, it could not be heard to complain on that ac-
count. The giving of the notice is not jurisdictional. 
The court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and 
of the parties served with process independent of the 
notice. No claim is made that there are any claims 
for material furnished in the construction of the 
school building other than that of Frank M. Allen 
Company. If there are any such claims they are, and 
at the time of the trial of this cause in the court below 
were, forever barred from enforcing such claims 
against the appellant, and therefore it can in no way 
be prejudiced because the notice was not published 
for a longer period of time. 
The trial court erred in determining that the plaintiff 
was not a proper party plaintiff. Plaintiff was the real party 
in interest and the failure to sue in the name of the state 
constituted no prejudice whatever to defendants. 
The new statute contains no such provision and under 
the third party contract doctrine has no possible application 
to this case, the trial judge's decision to the contrary (R-48), 
notwithstanding. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION WAS NOT FILED 
WITHIN THE TIME REQUIRED BY THE 
STATUTE. 
In addition to Plaintiff's rights against U. S. Steel on the 
construction contract, discussed under Point II, above, Plain-
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tiff is entitled to judgment on the bond against both U. S. 
Steel and the Surety on the basis of the old statute, Section 
14-1-2, UCA 1953, and the trial court erred in holding that 
Plaintiff's action was not filed within the time required by 
the statute. 
As heretofore stated, Plaintiff was a material.man having 
furnished materials to Subcontractor on the construction 
project and as a material.man was entitled to sue on the bond. 
Plaintiff furnished the last materials on or before December 
10, 1962, and the final settlement date of the contract was 
May 21, 1963. The old statute, then in force, provided that 
suit must be commenced within one year after the date of 
complete performance and final settlement of the contract. 
Plaintiff's suit was filed on May 15, 1963, within one 
year of the settlement date and within the time limit set by 
the old statute. 
Effective May 14, 1963, the old statute was repealed 
and the new statute enacted. The latter contained two sig-
nificant procedural changes affecting suits upon contractors' 
bonds. The first required materialmen of subcontractors to 
give the general contractor 90 days written notice prior to 
suit; the second changed the limitation period for filing suits 
by requiring that suits be filed within one year from the date 
on which the last material was furnished. 
Under the factual circumstances of this case, Plaintiff 
could not possibly have complied with the procedural re-
quirements of the new statute. The 90-day period as applied 
to Plaintiff had already expired by the time the new statute 
was enacted. The changed limitation period for filing suit 
had shortened the time within which Plaintiff could file by 
five months. 
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The Contractors' Bonds statutes as they permit suits by 
materialmen are highly remedial, and must, in furtherance 
of justice, receive a liberal construction and application so 
as to accomplish their real objective and purpose. Mellon v. 
Vondor-Horst Bros., 44 Utah 300, 140 P. 130. It would be a 
denial of justice to deny Plaintiff the right to recover under 
either the old or the new statute. 
Plaintiff's rights on the bond arose under the old statute 
which was law when the construction contract was executed 
and when Plaintiff delivered the last materials. These rights 
had accrued and should not be affected by repeal of the 
statute. 
The claim of the plaintiff below for half pilotage 
fee, resting upon a transaction regarded by the law 
as a quasi contract, there is no just ground for the 
position that it fell with the repeal of the statute un-
der which the transaction was had. When a right has 
arisen upon a contract, or a transaction in the nature 
of a contract, authorized by statute, and has been so 
far perfected that nothing remains to be done by the 
party asserting it, the repeal of the statute does not 
affect it, or an action for its enforcement. It has be-
come a vested right which stands independent of the 
statute. Pacific M.S.S. Co. v. lollife, 2 Wall 450. 
In Chism v. Phelps ( 1958 Ark) 311 S. W. 2d 297, the 
Arkansas Supreme Court had before it a personal injury ac-
tion involving the effect of repeal of a comparative negli-
gence statute. The Court said: 
As the New Hampshire court stated in the case of 
In re Opinion of the Justices, supra (89 N.H. 563, 
198 A. 250); The repeal of a statute renders it thence-
forth inoperative, but it does not undo or set aside 
the consequences of its operation while in force, un-
less such a result is directed by express language or 
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necessary implication. A status established in a man-
ner which becomes proscribed is not lost by the mere 
fact of the proscription. 
Even as here, where no question of vested rights 
is involved, the presumption is that the repeal of an 
act does not invalidate the accrued results of its 
operative tenure. To undo such results by a repeal is 
to give it retroactivity, and based upon elemental 
principals of justice a rule of construction avoids that 
effect if the language of the repeal does not clearly 
require it. 
The same reasoning applies to the instant case. Plaintiff 
should be allowed to recover against U. S. Steel and its 
surety under the old statute. 
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CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and 
judgment be entered in favor of plaintiff against U. S. Steel 
because the trial court failed to recognize Plaintiff's con-
tractual rights as a third party beneficiary of the construc-
tion contract. Plaintiff should also be entitled to recover 
under the Contractors' Bond statute from both U. S. Steel 
and Federal Insurance Co., its surety, because it would be a 
denial of justice to deny Plaintiff the right to recover under 
the facts of this case. The trial Court was in error in holding 
( 1) that Plaintiff is not a proper party plaintiff; ( 2) that 
said action should have been filed in Daggett County; and 
( 3) that said action was not filed within the time required 
by the statute. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WAYNE C. DURHAM and GARY L. THEURER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
The American Oil Company 
428 American Oil Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
